Operation Epic Fury: From Regional Escalation to Global Cyber Risk

In light of escalating geopolitical tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, LevelBlue is urging organizations to adopt a “Shields Up” posture, similar to the guidance launched by CISA at the outset of the Ukraine and Russia conflict.

This LevelBlue SpiderLabs advisory outlines what we have observed to date, the steps we have taken to protect our clients, key findings from our monitoring and intelligence analysis, and the actions organizations should prioritize as the situation continues to evolve.

As a trusted security partner, LevelBlue is actively monitoring threat intelligence and client environments for indicators of emerging risk. We remain on heightened alert and are prepared to support clients and partners with real-time intelligence updates and incident response assistance as needed. We will continue to provide timely updates and actionable guidance as developments unfold.

Actions Implemented for LevelBlue Clients

LevelBlue has elevated monitoring across all known clients with regional exposure and has implemented the following measures:

• High-Vigilance Monitoring Activated: Enhanced monitoring for clients operating in or connected to the Middle East, with focused attention on Iranian IP space and TTPs associated with known Iranian threat actors.
• Increased Escalation Priority: Accelerated review and response protocols for alerts potentially linked to Iranian infrastructure or threat actor behaviors.

This is an early and rapidly evolving phase of conflict. Actions, threats, and intelligence are moving quickly, creating substantial signal-to-noise challenges for cyber defense teams. We anticipate a potential rise in threat campaigns focused on disruption, denial, and destruction, potentially deprioritizing traditional objectives such as data theft and exfiltration.

Organizations with direct operations, regional partnerships, or supply chain exposure in the Middle East should take immediate steps to:

• Enhance monitoring and threat detection
• Validate defensive controls
• Confirm incident response readiness

Recommended Immediate Actions

• Know Your Infrastructure and Dependencies: Organizations should identify their most critical systems and assets for their operations and understand their potential dependencies on other infrastructure systems that enable the continuity of their own operations.
• Assess Your Risks: Consider the full range of threats and hazards that could disrupt your organization’s infrastructure operations and evaluate specific vulnerabilities and consequences the threats and hazards could pose.
• Make Actionable Plans: Organizations should develop both a strategic risk management plan to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities identified as well as actionable incident response and recovery plans to help withstand disruptions and rapidly restore operations within minimal downtime.
• Measure Progress to Continuously Improve: Exercise incident response and recovery plans under realistic conditions and periodically evaluate and update strategic plans. An organization’s ability to prepare for and adapt to changing risk conditions starts with fostering a culture of continuous improvement, based on lessons learned from exercises and real-world incidents.

Key Findings

• The Israel-Iran conflict has evolved into a sustained hybrid confrontation where cyber operations function as a parallel battlefield, potentially affecting Europe and the United States.

• European and US commercial organizations, particularly in energy, logistics, telecommunications, aviation, healthcare, and finance, are realistic secondary targets due to economic ties and geopolitical alignment.

• Iranian state-aligned groups follow a consistent intrusion lifecycle: phishing or credential abuse, persistence, lateral movement, and potential pivot from espionage to disruption during escalation.

• DDoS campaigns and hacktivist mobilization act as force multipliers, creating visibility, psychological impact, and operational noise even when technical sophistication is limited.

• The convergence of cyber operations with maritime instability and threats to connectivity infrastructure increases systemic risk to global supply chains and European data flows.

• Many operations can be conducted remotely or amplified by individuals outside Iran, making attribution more complex and expanding the operational surface within Western societies.

• The primary strategic risk is not a single catastrophic attack but a synchronized campaign combining cyber disruption, economic pressure, and influence operations to undermine stability and public trust.

Hybrid Warfare Without Borders

The escalating confrontation between Israel and Iran is no longer confined to missiles, drones, or regional proxy conflicts. It has evolved into a persistent and deeply embedded cyber confrontation that increasingly affects the United States, Europe, and a growing number of other countries. What was once considered a shadow cyber campaign between two regional adversaries has become a transnational security challenge with global implications for governments, enterprises, and critical infrastructure operators.

Figure 1. Handala Claims hacking Israeli energy facility

Over the past decade, cyber operations linked to Israeli and Iranian interests have matured significantly. Iranian state-aligned groups have expanded from regional disruptive attacks to complex espionage, ransomware-style operations, supply chain compromises, and influence campaigns targeting Western institutions. At the same time, Israel, widely regarded as one of the most capable cyber powers, has demonstrated advanced offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. The result is a persistent low-intensity cyber conflict that operates below the threshold of open warfare but carries strategic consequences far beyond the Middle East.

Figure 2. Iranian clerics issued religious fatwa against USA to all Muslims.

For the US and European countries, the risk is not theoretical. Financial institutions, energy providers, healthcare systems, transportation networks, defense contractors, and technology firms have all appeared in threat reporting connected to actors aligned with Tehran or Tel Aviv, often targeted not for direct involvement but for political alignment or symbolic value.

The digital battlefield does not respect geography, and alliances in the physical world translate into exposure in cyberspace. In parallel, periods of escalation have been accompanied by ideological rhetoric from elements within Iran’s clerical establishment framing confrontation in religious terms, which can energize online sympathizers and loosely affiliated hacktivist activity. While most Muslim communities globally are not connected to cyber operations, open digital ecosystems allow motivated individuals anywhere to amplify propaganda, participate in DDoS campaigns, or conduct low-level disruptive attacks, increasing volatility and unpredictability during wartime escalation.

What makes the current phase particularly concerning is the blending of cyber operations with kinetic escalation. When physical hostilities intensify, cyber activity often spikes in parallel. Disruption of media outlets, attacks on public alert systems, defacement campaigns, destructive malware deployments, and coordinated disinformation operations frequently accompany military events. Cyber operations are used to shape perception, erode public trust, gather intelligence, and create psychological pressure beyond the immediate conflict zone.

For global businesses and public sector leaders, the key question is no longer whether this conflict affects them, but how and when. The Israel-Iran cyberwarfare represents a model of modern hybrid warfare, where geopolitical tension is translated into digital intrusion, economic coercion, and infrastructure targeting. Understanding this evolving landscape is essential for risk assessment, incident preparedness, and strategic decision making.

Global Logistics Effects

The confrontation is increasingly visible not only in cyberspace, but across global logistics corridors and maritime trade routes. Ports, shipping operators, and harbor infrastructure have become high-value targets for both cyber intrusion and physical disruption. Even limited attacks or credible threats against major harbors can trigger temporary shutdowns, vessel rerouting, and precautionary security measures. In an interconnected supply chain ecosystem, a single disrupted port can cascade into delays across continents, affecting manufacturing timelines, retail inventories, and industrial production.

Figure 3. Statement in Telegram channel illustrates Iranian attack against oil tanker.

Energy markets are particularly sensitive. The Middle East remains central to global oil supply, and any escalation that threatens shipping lanes or export terminals immediately influences market perception. Even short-lived disruptions or cyber incidents affecting port management systems, tanker scheduling platforms, or customs processing can create uncertainty.

That uncertainty alone is often enough to drive oil price spikes, increase freight insurance premiums, and elevate transportation costs for both raw materials and finished goods.

Figure 4. Statement in Telegram channel illustrating consequences of Iranian strike on Oil Facility in Saudi Arabia.

For the world markets, the impact is indirect but tangible. Higher oil prices translate into inflationary pressure, increased operational costs for logistics and aviation, and greater strain on already fragile supply chains. When cyber operations intersect with maritime infrastructure and energy exports, regional conflict becomes a global economic stress multiplier. In this environment, cybersecurity is no longer just a technical concern. It is a core component of economic stability and national resilience.

Iranian Cyber Playbook and What to Expect

Iranian state-aligned and pro-Iranian hacktivist groups have developed a recognizable escalation ladder over the past decade, beginning with visible but relatively low-impact operations and moving toward strategic disruption. At the lighter end of the spectrum are coordinated defacements, propaganda campaigns, and DDoS waves.

Figure 5. Anti-Israeli group claims DDoS attacks against Israeli financial facilities.

During periods of geopolitical tension, public-facing portals of governments, banks, media outlets, and transportation providers are often flooded with traffic to signal retaliation and demonstrate digital reach. These campaigns are not always technically advanced, but they are politically timed, high volume, and psychologically impactful.

Figure 6. March 2nd Hackers group distribution according to Cyber Know review (https://x.com/Cyberknow20/status/2027753118864474168)

A defining feature of Iranian cyber escalation is the rapid mobilization of loosely affiliated pro-Iranian and pro-Palestinian hacktivist collectives. In previous conflicts, Telegram-based groups and self-declared cyber resistance movements conducted opportunistic intrusions, data leaks, and service disruptions against Western brands.

Figure 7. Russian-based group claims DDoS attacks against Israeli targets.

While many of these actors operate without clear state command and control, their activity amplifies noise, increases defensive workload, and blurs attribution. Even low-sophistication attacks can create operational friction and reputational damage, especially when combined with coordinated information operations.

Figure 8. Keymous group claims hacking into portal of the Ministry of Education of Israel.

Beyond hacktivism, more structured and persistent threat activity is associated with groups such as MuddyWater (aka Seedworm), Charming Kitten, also known as APT35 or Phosphorus, OilRig, also known as APT34, Elfin aka APT33, and APT42, also tracked as CharmingCypress. These actors typically begin with spear phishing, credential harvesting, password spraying, or exploitation of exposed services. Once inside a network, they deploy web shells, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term persistence for intelligence collection. European commercial organizations in telecommunications, aviation, energy, healthcare, academia, logistics, and cloud services are realistic targets, particularly when linked economically or politically to Israel or the United States.

Figure 9. Scorpion hacking team shares Israeli citizens’IDs claiming hacking Mossad.

The danger increases when espionage pivots to disruption. Iranian-affiliated actors have previously deployed wiper malware and conducted destructive campaigns designed to erase systems rather than monetize access. In a wartime environment, similar tactics could be directed at port operators, energy distribution networks, transportation systems, or financial platforms across Europe.

Data theft followed by strategic leaks, ransomware encryption without a financial motive, or simultaneous DDoS attacks against banking infrastructure could aim to undermine public trust and create economic instability rather than generate profit.

Figure 10. Translated part of the statement of the Pro-Iranian Cyber group asking peoeple to join cyberwarfare.

At the highest end of the escalation spectrum lies the convergence of cyber and physical disruption. The broader regional dynamic includes the Houthis' movement, whose attacks on maritime routes and reported incidents involving undersea internet cables in the Red Sea highlight how kinetic actions can affect digital connectivity. Physical damage to subsea cables or maritime infrastructure, combined with cyber intrusions and coordinated influence campaigns, could degrade regional data flows and strain European commercial operations. In such a blended scenario, the threat moves from nuisance-level disruption to systemic risk, affecting supply chains, financial stability, and national resilience across multiple countries simultaneously.

Many of these operations do not require actors to be physically based in Iran.

In an era of global connectivity, cyber campaigns, hacktivist mobilization, and influence operations can be executed remotely or amplified by individuals residing in Europe or the United States, whether knowingly or unknowingly participating in coordinated digital activity. This makes the threat landscape more diffuse, harder to attribute, and significantly more complex for Western security services to contain.

Conclusions

The evolving Israel–Iran cyber confrontation represents a model of modern hybrid warfare where geopolitical tension translates directly into digital risk for Western economies. Europe and the United States are not peripheral observers but interconnected stakeholders whose commercial and critical infrastructure ecosystems may be leveraged for retaliation, signaling, or strategic destabilization. The progression from nuisance-level disruption to coordinated, infrastructure-level impact is both technically feasible and historically consistent with Iranian threat actor behavior.

Organizations must therefore reassess risk assumptions, particularly in sectors tied to logistics, energy, finance, and telecommunications. The primary danger is not a single catastrophic cyber strike, but a synchronized campaign combining intrusion, disruption, influence operations, and economic pressure. In this environment, resilience, segmentation of operational systems, proactive threat hunting, and crisis communication planning become strategic necessities rather than technical enhancements.

Remediations

In the current geopolitical climate, remediation cannot be treated as a post-incident technical checklist. It must be approached as a strategic resilience program aligned with the reality of hybrid warfare. The Israel–Iran cyber confrontation demonstrates that organizations across Europe and the United States may become indirect participants in a broader conflict simply due to political alignment, supply chain connectivity, or symbolic value. Preparation, therefore, requires proactive defense, rapid detection capability, and executive-level awareness.

Organizations should prioritize attack surface reduction. This includes strict patch management, elimination of exposed services, enforcement of MFA across all remote access points, and continuous monitoring for password spraying or credential abuse. Network segmentation between IT and operational technology environments is critical, especially in energy, transportation, logistics, and industrial sectors. Many destructive scenarios become possible only when attackers can pivot laterally from user workstations into production systems.

Detection and response capabilities must be strengthened. Continuous threat hunting focused on behaviors associated with groups such as MuddyWater, APT35, APT34, APT33, and APT42 is essential. Organizations should monitor for web shell artifacts, unusual administrative activity, suspicious PowerShell usage, and abnormal outbound connections. Regular tabletop exercises simulating wiper malware, coordinated DDoS waves, and simultaneous data leaks can significantly improve crisis readiness. Backup strategies must include immutable, and offline copies, tested regularly for restoration under pressure.

Leadership level preparedness is crucial. Cyber incidents in this context are not purely technical events but reputational and geopolitical risks as well. Clear crisis communication plans, coordination with national cybersecurity authorities, and predefined decision-making frameworks reduce confusion during escalation. Organizations operating in sensitive sectors should also evaluate third-party and supply chain dependencies, particularly cloud providers, telecom carriers, and maritime or logistics partners. In a blended scenario of cyber disruption and physical instability, resilience depends not only on internal defenses but on the strength of the broader ecosystem.